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We tackle the important issue of what the appropriate trends in the real Yen-
Dollar and RMB-Dollar are over time.  Over the long-run, the real yen has been 
appreciating against the U.S. dollar; while the real RMB-dollar rate has been 
depreciating (until 1999). In this paper, we build a macroeconomic-trade model of 
Japan-U.S. trade on the one hand, and China-U.S. trade on the other. Our model is 
essentially a general equilibrium extension of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. We 
show that these long-run trends in the real yen-dollar and RMB-dollar rates in the 
data can be justified by our model.   
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I thank the economists at the Institute for helpful advice, and the participants at 
the Institute seminar in July 2012 and an anonymous referee for very useful 
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1 Introduction
The appropriate levels of the yen-dollar and the RMB-dollar exchange rates
are controversial topics. Since the late-1980s, the Japanese yen has appreciated
rapidly against the U.S. dollar, leading to declines in Japanese corporate prots.
The RMB is often alleged to be "undervalued" against the U.S. dollar, giving
Chinese exporters unfair advantages in U.S. markets (Williamson, 2008).
In this paper, we tackle the question of what the appropriate paths of the
real yen-dollar and RMB-dollar exchange rates are over time. Our benchmark
is widely accepted in the international nance literature as a very long-term
benchmark for the real exchange rate: the Balassa-Samuelson model. The
Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect is the tendency of countries with higher productiv-
ity in tradeables compared with non-tradeables to have higher price levels, and
therefore an appreciating exchange rate.1 Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996, p. 213)
show in a simple example that if the productivity growth advantage in trade-
ables for the U.S.(vis-a-vis its trading partner) is greater than the productivity
growth advantage in non-tradeables, the U.S. price index will be appreciating
relative to the foreign price index, so that the real dollar exchange rate would
be appreciating over time.2
Here we develop a macroeconomic-trade model of the very long-run yen-
dollar and RMB-dollar real exchange rates, in which we take into account the
shifts in production and trade between Japan and the U.S. and China and the
U.S. To understand how the changes in the yen-dollar and RMB-dollar real
exchange rates relates to di¤erence in Japan-U.S. and China-U.S labor produc-
tivities, we build a two-country, three-sector (agriculture, manufacturing, and
services) macroeconomic-trade model of Japan and the U.S. on the one hand,
and China and the U.S. on the other hand. We treat agricultural and manu-
facturing goods as tradeable, and services as nontradeable. We calibrate our
model to the data of each country in 1995, so that the degree of tradeability (or
home bias), and other consumption and production parameters are calculated
from the data. Trade is Ricardian, and the driving forces of our model are
the productivities in each of the three sectors in both countries. Given these
di¤erential sectoral productivites and consumption and production parameters,
trade in agriculture and in manufacturing, and the employment shares in each
of the three sectors respond endogenously.
1This model has received widespread empirical support for a sample of industrialized post-
war economies. For example, while Japan is more productive than the U.S. in manufacturers,
the U.S. is far more productive than Japan in services. This has led to a rapid appreciation
of the yen-dollar real exchange rate over time.
2The idea behind the Balassa-Samuelson model is that if the gap in tradeables and non-
tradeables productivity growth is higher in the U.S. than say, the U.K., then non-tradeables
prices in the U.S. will be rising faster than non-tradeable prices in the U.K. , although tradeable
prices in the two countries are equated by free trade. Therefore, the weighted average of
tradeables and non-tradeablesthe price indexwill be rising faster in the U.S. than in the
U.K. The real U.S. dollar-U.K. pound exchange rate will be appreciating.
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The real exchange rate computed from our model is an equilibrium or long-
run benchmark in the following sense. When the actual real exchange rate is
equal to the real exchange rate as simulated by our model, rms are not mak-
ing excessively expansive or diminished sales or prots. Suppose that some
shock, say, a rapid expansion in the money supply in Japan raises Japanese
non-tradeable prices and appreciates the Japanese real exchange rate, and the
Japanese real exchange rate departs from the equilibrium simulated by our
model. Then the appreciation of the Japanese real exchange rate makes Japanese
industries uncompetitive against U.S. industries. Japanese industries will run
losses, and will lose employment.
This competitive discrepancy should be adjusted over time through changes
in relative Japan-U.S. wages, capital costs, and di¤erential rates of technical
progress. However, empirically, the speed at which the real exchange rate
reaches equilibrium parity is very slow. According to Froot and Rogo¤ (1995),
standard estimates of the real exchange half-life are in the range of two to ve
years. Eventually, however, after 10, 15, or 20 years, absent further shocks,
the actual Japanese real exchange rate should return to the equlibrium real
exchange rate simulated by our model. The main nding of our paper is that
our model explains well, the long-run trend behaviors of the real yen-dollar and
RMB-dollar exchange rates.
In addition to simulating the long-run trends in the equilibrium real exchange
rates, our model allows us to capture the large structural changes in employment
that Japan and China are undergoing. In Japan, there is de-industrialization
(or the shift of labor out of manufacturing and into services) and in China, there
is industrialization (or the shift of labor out of agriculture and into manufactur-
ing). In todays most advanced economies, the share of industrial employment
has been declining for more than three decades. For example, the industrial
employment share fell from 47 percent to 37 percent, while the services employ-
ment share increased from 44 percent to about 60 percent from 1977 to 2010 in
Japan. With regards to industrialization, the substantial and permanent shift
out of labor from agriculture into non-agriculture has been observed as a promi-
nent feature of economic development. In China, the agricultural employment
share fell from over 70 percent to under 40 percent from 1980 to 2010.
A key assumption in our model is that there is no capital accumulation. This
reduces the analysis of our model to only static or of balanced growth paths,
simplifying our analysis.3 To the extent that the motivation of our paper is
to understand the very long-run trends in the real exchange rate and not the
direction of capital ows, our simplication of no capital accumulation appears
reasonable.4
3The Appendix shows that a balanced growth path exists for our model.
4 It is certainly true that labor productivity is a combination of total factor productivity
and the capital labor ratio. If the production function is Cobb-Douglas, given our production
function, Y=L below, labor productivity is  = A1=(r=)=(1 ); where  is the capital
share, A is total factor productivity, and r is the real interest rate, which is related to the
capital labor ratio.
Thus, if Japan and China have di¤erent rates of capital accumulation, part of the higher
labor productivity growth in China may be due to more rapid capital accumulation in China.
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2 Literature Review
Ours is one of the rst papers to focus on the real exchange rate in a model of
structural transformation. Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2008) examine equilib-
rium exchange rates across multiple countries, but they do not examine their
models implications for the structural transformations of China and the U.S.
Dekle and Fukao (2011) examine the real exchange rate between Japan and the
U.S. and nds that the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect is observed. Ungor (2012),
Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996, Ch. 4) and Matsuyama (2009), Stefanski (2011),
Teignier (2011), and Yi and Zhang (2011) examine the de-industrialization hy-
pothesis (or the movement of labor out of manufacturing) in the industrialized
economies using a trade model, but do not examine the implications of their
model for the real exchange rate. Asea and Mendoza (1994) and De Grego-
rio, Giovannini, and Wolf (1994) provide careful econometric studies of the real
exchange rate and the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect.
Compared to our long- to very long-run analysis of real exchange rates,
other papers are more interested in real exchange rates in the shorter runs. For
example, Lane (2011) is concerned with more medium-run movements. In the
medium-run, large creditors such as China or Japan, for example, experience
an appreciation of their real exchange rate, as net investment inows lead to
an excess of domestic absorption relative to domestic production (the transfer
e¤ect). In our very long-run model, trade is balanced and there is no transfer
e¤ect. Obstfeld (2011) characterizes real exchange rates from the short- to the
long-runs, and depicts how business cycles and monetary policies can change
real exchange rates, and cause the short-run real exchange rate to deviate from
its long-run value. He shows that the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect appears to hold
in the long- to very long-runs, although empirically it may take more than 20
years for the real exchange rate to revert to its equlibrium value.
3 Model
We consider a 2-country, 3-sector model, where time is discrete and indexed by
t= 0, 1, ...innity. There is a measure 1 of identical, innitely lived households
endowed with 1 unit of productive time each period in each country. Households
have preferences dened over 3 sectors. Sector 1 is the agricultural sector, sector
2 is services, and sector 3 is manufacturing. The agricultural and manufacturing
sectors are traded. Labor is the only factor of production. Di¤erent goods
in di¤erent countries are produced with di¤erent (labor) productivities. This
"Ricardian" feature of the model and the degree of substitutability in preferences
between home and foreign produced units of each good endogenously determine
a countrys equilibrium pattern of production and trade.
By admitting that our modeland concept of the real exchange rateapplies to only to long-run
steady-state paths, we abstract from the complicated dynamics arising from the accumulation
of capital.
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3.1 Agents and Preferences
There is a representative agent in each country i, where i=1 is Japan or China,
and i=2 is the U.S., who consumes all three types of goods j (in the three sec-
tors) and works. The agent in each country is endowed with 1 unit of (paid)
market time in every period, and allocates his time across alternative employ-
ment activities in the domestic country. The model is e¤ectively a sequence of
static resource allocation problems. To ease notation in what follows, we sup-
press time subcripts. Consumption is the only determinant of the instantaneous










( 1)=)( 1)= where i = 1; 2:
Here Ci1; C
i
2 are determined by the Armington Aggregators, shown below,
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Cij1; and C
i
j2 refer to the consumption of good j by country i produced in
country 1 and country 2, respectively.
Parameter  is the (constant) elasticity of substitution between the di¤erent
goods. The utility weights ij inuence how consumption expediture is allo-
cated across goods in each country. We use the Armington assumption: goods
from di¤erent countries are imperfect substitutes; thus, demand for products
is distinguished by place of production. In other words, foreign goods enter
the economy as imperfect substitutes for domestic goods. Parameter " is the
constant elasticity of substitution (Armington elasticity) between domestically
produced and imported goods.The parameter of bias in preferences towards the
goods produced in country 1 is ij ;whereas (1 ij) represents the parameter of
bias in preference towards goods produced in country 2.
3.2 Production
There is a continuum of rms producing each good. Firms behave competi-
tively, taking prices of the production of goods and the factor of production as
given. Each good is produced using one factor of production, labor, in linear
technology:




j where i = 1; 2 j = 1; 2; 3
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The problem confronted by sector j in country i is the problem of maximizing
prots, subject to the production technology:
Max pijY
i
j   wiN ij where i = 1; 2 j = 1; 2; 3





where pi;j;t is the price of the good j in country i at time t. The rst-oder
conditions for the producers problem imply that the quantity of each good
j produced and the quantity of the factors hired in the industry satisfy, in
equilibrium:
pij = w
i=Aij where i = 1; 2 j = 1; 2; 3
3.3 Resource Constraints
National income (output) in country i is the monetary value of outputs from
each sector and is given by:
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Resource constraints for goods produced in traded sectors in each country i:
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Resource constraints for goods produced in non-traded sectors in country i:
Y i3 = C
i



















A competitive equilibrium consists of consumption decisions, labor allocations,
sectoral output decisions, and prices such that given prices, the rms allocations
solve its prot maximization problem, the consumers problem, and all product
and labor markets in both countries clear.
3.5 The Real Exchange Rate
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i = 1; 2:
3.6 Calibration
Exogenous Time Series.
Aij;t : We feed the sectoral productivity gures measured in the data for the




i = 1; 2
For Japan and the U.S., sectoral output and labor data are from EU KLEMS.
In China, the sectoral output and labor data are from various issues of the China
Statistical Yearbook.
The three sectoral productivities in each of the three countries are depicted
in Figures 1(a), (b), and (c). Figure 1(a) depicts sectoral labor productivities
in Japan. Labor productivity in manufacturing grew the fastest, and labor
productivity in services lagged in most years. While Japanese agricultural pro-
ductivity growth is relatively low, less than 7 percent of Japanese labor work
in the agricultural sector so that productivity growth there has little impact on
aggregate variables such as the real exchange rate. Figure 1(b) depicts produc-
tivities in the U.S. While productivity in U.S. services is not high, the gap in
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productivity between manufacturing and services is smaller in the U.S. than in
Japan, leading to the gradual appreciation of the yen against the dollar.
Figure 1(c) depicts sectoral labor productivities in China. What is remark-
able is the extremely high growth in manufacturing productivity in China.
While productivity growth in services is reasonable, the gap in productivity
growth between manufacturing and services is higher in China than in the U.S.,
implying that the RMB should be appreciating against the dollar in real terms
in the long-run.
This reasoning, however, ignores the large and important role of agriculture
in China. Between 1985 and 2010, agriculture on average employed more than
50 percent of the Chinese labor force. If Chinas agricultural sector is added
to the countrys manufacturing sector and both are treated as the tradeables
sector, then the gap in tradeables productivity and non-tradeables (services)
productivity in China will sharply decline, and the real RMB may no longer be
appreciating against the dollar.
Parameters.
We set the parameters to the intital year (1995) to match certain targets
in production and consumption. In all three countries, we set the elasticity of
substitution between two sectors as  = 0:50: In all three countries, we set the
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods for both agricultural
and industrial goods (the Armington elasticity) initially as  = 1:5: It is common
in many applied macroeconomic models to choose values of this elasticity of
substitution between 1 and 1.5 (Bodenstein, 2010).
Simonovska and Waugh (2011), however, have recently estimated Armington
elasticities as  = 2:5 or higher: Thus, as a robustness check, we performed
simulations for  = 2:5 and  = 4:0, and found that the simulated patterns for
the real exchange rates are robust to these di¤erent values of the Armington
elasticity.
Since our model is bilateral, we calibrate the data on bilateral data, rst on
Japanese and U.S. data, and second on Chinese and U.S. data. The home bias
parameters will thus di¤er, depending on which two country pairs the data are
calibrated. Since the pattern of trade di¤ers between Japan and the U.S. on
the one hand and China and the U.S. on the other, the calibrated home bias
parameters di¤er between the two bilateral pairs of trading countries.
Given ; the home consumption bias parameters, , are calibrated to match
the initial ratios of sectoral domestic consumption to sectoral imports scaled by





























































i = 1; 2
For Japan, sectoral consumption data are from the Annual Report on the
National Accounts. For China, sectoral consumption data are from the China
Statistical Yearbook. For the U.S. sectoral consumption data are from the Sta-
tistical Abstracts. For all three countries, sectoral trade, exports and imports,
and terms of trade data are from UN Comtrade data.
As a result of this calibration procedure, 1; 2;3 the utility weights on agri-
cultural, manufactured, and service goods were calibrated as 0.33 for all three
goods (in the two countries); 1; 2 the home bias parameters for agricultural
and manufactured goods were calibrated as 0.45 for the country pair, Japan
and the U.S.; and 0.7 for the country pair, China and the U.S. Most impor-
tantly, the results of the calibration exercise show that agricultural goods are as
"tradeable" as manufactured goods at the level of aggregation of our interest.
In this paper, we are mainly concerned with the long-run trends in the real
exchange rates, not the actual levels of the the real exchange rates. Still in our
graphs, we will have to choose a date when the actual real exchange rate is
in equilibrium according to some criteria (other than the Balassa-Samuelson).
We will x the model simulated real exchange rates as equal to the actual real
exchange rate at the date when two criteria are satised. Our rst criterion
is to choose the real exhange rate that sets the trade balance equal to zero.
Our second criterion is to choose the date when the exchange rate satises the
"Purchasing-Power Parity" condition.
For the Japan-U.S. pair, using the two criteria above, we nd that the acual
yen-dollar real exchange rate was in equilibrium around 1980. Between 1979
and 1980, Japans trade balance shifted from positive to negative and was nearly
zero. Also, the PPP exchange rate estimated by Summers and Heston (2012)
was 226 and the actual nominal exchange rate averaged about 226 in 1980.
For the China-U.S. pair, using the two criteria above, we nd that the actual
RMB-dollar real exchange rate was in equilibrium around 1989. Chinas trade
balance was nearly zero, and the RMB-dollar real exchange rate was close to
the purchasing-power rate in 1989 (according to Summers and Heston (2012)).
Preliminary simulations showed that the baseline model above (of Section
3) misses capturing the actual trends in the agricultural employment share in
China and the services employment shares in Japan and in China. To better t
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the actual employment shares in agriculture and services in China and services in
Japan, we modify our model utility functions to include "subsistence agricultural




1   c11)( 1)= + 12(C12 )( 1)= + 13(C13 + c13)( 1)=)( 1)=;
where in Japan, c11 = 0:
Subsistence food (agricultural goods) consumption introduces non-homotheticity
in the household utility function. With non-homotheticity, as income rises, more
income will be spent on consuming non-agricultural goods, leading to an in-
crease in demand for non-agricultural goods, and a larger shift in labor out of
agriculture into non-agriculture.
Similarly, if there is say, home production of services, such as household
work, as income increases there is relatively more demand for the market pro-
curement of that service, such as the hiring of maids to do the household work.
Services employment should grow faster with rising income and home produc-
tion. We choose c11 , and c
1
3 to better t the trends in the agricultural and
services employment shares in China; and c13 to better t the trend in services
employment in Japan.
We assume that home production of services comes from leisure time, and
does not a¤ect the total quantity of market (paid) work in the three sectors,
which is xed at unity.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline Simulations for the Japan and the U.S. Pair
Figure 2 depicts the Japan-U.S. Real Exchange Rate in the data (solid line)
and simulated from the model (dashed line)5 . As it is well known, after the
September 1985 Plaza Accord meeting, the yen-dollar nominal exchange rate
steadily appreciated, momentarily reaching below 90 yen per dollar in early
1995. Subsequently, the yen weakened to as much as 130, although it has mostly
been in the 110-120 range in the 2000s. However, after the Lehman shock in the
fall of 2008, the nominal yen-dollar rate started to appreciate, reaching about
87 yen to the dollar in 2010.
5 In the data, the real exchange rate is dened as the ratio of the weighted GDP deators
in the two countries in terms of dollars. To convert the Japanese GDP deator into dollars,
we use the nominal yen-dollar exchange rate. In the model, the real exchange rate is dened
as the ratio of the weighted averages of the prices in the agricultural, manufacturing, and the
services sectors in Japan and the U.S.
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The dashed line, the model simulated real exchange rate, generally tracks the
data well in the very long run. Specically, we observe the Balassa-Samuelson
e¤ectan appreciation of the Japanese real exchange rate over the long-run. De-
spite the common impression that during Japans "lost decade" in the 1990s and
in the early 2000s, Japanese productivity growth was low, Japanese productiv-
ity growth in the tradeables sectors such as automotives and electronics were
usually higher than that in the U.S., which explains the (slight) trend appreci-
ation in the yen-dollar equilibrium real exchange rate during this time (Dekle
and Fukao, 2011).
Unsurprisingly, in our model with no money and no price rigidities, we miss
most of the short- and medium-run uctuations of the real exchange rate. If we
take the simulated real exchange rate series as a long-run benchmark, we nd
that the actual real exchange rate was "overvalued" from 1986 and extremely
overvalued until 1995, at which point the actual real yen-dollar exchange rate
started to depreciate. Between 2000-2005, the yen real exchange rate was rela-
tively weak. Following the 2008-2009 global nancial crisis, the real yen started
to appreciate again.
We have shown that slower relative productivity growth in the services in-
dustry will tend to appreciate the real exchange rate in the long run. Many
observers also tie to the faster productivity growth in tradeable goods, the
decline in employment of the manufacturing sector of industrialized countries
the so-called "de-industrialization" e¤ect. The economic reasoning is simple:
with fewer workers able to produce a higher volume of manufacturers, some
workers will have to switch jobs to services.
As Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996, Ch. 4) and Matsuyama (2008) point out,
however, this simple reasoning does not account for the fact that demand for
and thereby employment in manufacturers in a particular country may fall o¤,
owing to the decline in their price in the global market, because of oversupply or
increased global competition. The change in manufacturing generally depends in
a complicated way on sectoral demand and supply elasticities, both domestic and
abroad. Our model allows us to solve for these complicated general equilibrium
e¤ects of sectoral productivity and trade on sectoral employment shares. We
compare our model simulations with what actually happened to the employment
shares in the three sectors in Japan 1980 and 2010
Figures 3 (a), (b), and (c) depict the trends in the labor shares for the agri-
cultural, manufacturing, and services sectors in Japan in the data (solid lines)
and in the model (dashed lines). The share of Japanese employment in agricul-
ture dropped from 8.5 percent to about 3 percent from 1980 to 2010. The model
overpredicts the agricultural share. This is because in a model of U.S.-Japan bi-
lateral trade, Japans trade with large agricultural exporters such as Brazil and
Thailand are excluded. Agricultural imports from these countries should serve
to depress Japanese agricultural employment. The model captures the "de-
industrialization"or the decline in Japans manufacturing employmentvery
well, while the model predicts the sharp rise in Japanese services employment
rather well.
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4.1.1 Robustness Checks for the Japan-U.S. Pair.
In applied macroeconomic-trade models, the simulation results are often sensi-
tive to values of the Armington elasticity, ": Here we check whether our results
are sensitive to raising the Armington elasticities from 1.5 to 2.5 and 4.0.
Figures 4 (a) and (b) depict the simulated equilibrium yen-dollar real ex-
changes rates under " = 2:5 and " = 4:0: It appears that the shocks to the
equilibrium real exchange rates are rather insensitive to increases in the value
of the Armington elasticity.
4.2 Simulations for the China and the U.S. Pair
Figure 5 depicts the long-run RMB-dollar rate in the data (solid line) from 1985
to 2010. While the trend in the Japan-U.S. real exchange rate is familiar to most
audiences, the trend in the China-U.S. real exchange rate may be less familiar.
We can see that from 1985 to about 1999, the RMB-dollar real exchange rate
has been depreciating, despite a much higher rate of real economic growth in
China compared to that in the U.S. Between 2000, the RMB-dollar rate was
relatively at, but since 2005, the RMBdollar rate has been appreciating, in
fact, quite rapidly.
The Balassa-Samuelson theory says that the secular change in the real dollar-
RMB rate should depend on the "di¤erence-in-di¤erence" in tradeables and non-
tradeables productivity growth within and between China and the U.S. Between
1985 and 2010, annualized average real labor productivity was 1.9 percent in
agriculture, 3.0 percent in manufacturing, and 1.9 percent in services in the U.S.;
and 4.3 percent in agriculture, 8.0 percent in manufacturing, and 5.0 percent in
services in China. The gap in productivity between manufactures (tradeables)
and services (non-tradeables) in the U.S. was 1.1 percent and 3.0 percent in
China. Thus, given the productivity di¤erentials, the Balassa-Samuelson theory
predicts that the RMB-dollar real exchange rate should be appreciating.
The calculation above, however, ignores the important role that the size
and productivity of the agricultural or primary goods sector plays in China.
Agricultural or primary goods output was over 50 percent of total output in
China in many of the years after 1985.6 If we treat agricultural or primary
goods as traded goods, then the "di¤erence-in-di¤erence" in tradeables and non-
tradeables productivities between the U.S. and China drops from 1.9 percent to
about -0.1 percent, predicting a rather constant or slightly depreciating RMB-
dollar real exchange rate over time.7
6"Agricultural" output and employment include all primary goods output and employment,
including food, raw materials, and mineral fuels.
7China does engage in considerable agricultural or primary goods trade. In 1985, primary
goods imports were 12 percent of total Chinese imports. In 2008, primary goods imports,
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In fact, that is what we nd in our model simulations (Figure 5, dashed line).
The equilibrium long-run real RMB-dollar real exchange is depreciating over
time (dashed line). Our analysis suggests that the long-run real depreciation in
the RMB-dollar exchange rate can be justied by the sectoral productivity and
trade patterns between China and the U.S.
Figures 6 (a), (b), and (c) depict the trends in the Chinese sectoral labor
shares. As noted, the agricutural employment share in China has been sharply
decreasing, while the manufacturing and services shares have been increasing.
After taking into account, Chinese subsistence agricultural consumption and
home production in services, the model (dashed lines) now tracks the trends in
the data (solid line) quite well.
4.2.1 Robustness Checks for the China-U.S. Pair.
Figures 7 (a) and (b) depict the simulated equilibrium RMB-dollar real exchange
rates under " = 2:5 and " = 4:0: Again, the long-run depreciating patterns in
the model simulated RMB-dollar real exchange rates appear robust to increases
in the value of the Armington elasticity
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect explains well, the long-
run trend behaviors in the yen-dollar and the RMB-dollar real exchange rates.
In particular, our model can explain the puzzling long-run real depreciation
(from 1989-1999) or the lack of real appreciation (from 2000 to 2005) of the
RMB-dollar real exchange rate.
The proportion of the labor force in Chinese agriculture has fallen to around
30 percent in 2011, as many rural dwellers moved from the farms and into the
cities. As Chinese labor leaves the farm and joins the manufacturing sector, and
as continued mechanization proceeds, productivity in Chinese agriculture should
continue to increase. These interrelated trends are probably responsible for the
actual appreciation of the Chinese real exchange rate against the dollar since
2005. Over the next few decades, we should see continued rapid appreciation
of the real Chinese currency, a pattern observed for the Japanese yen since the
1970s.
especially raw materials and mineral fuels were 32 percent of total imports. In 1985, primary
goods exports were 50 percent of Chinas total exports. In 2008, primary goods exports were
5 percent of Chinas total exports.
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6 Appendix
6.1 The Balanced-Growth Path in Our Model
Given that the one period utility functions in any two countries are CES and
homothetic, we can aggregate the utility functions of the two countries into a


















dened over the six goods (three in each country). $k are the consumption
weights chosen by the social planner, taking into account, each countrys utility
and production functions, labor endowment (labor allocation in each period),
and productivity growth. With this set-up, we can drop country superscripts;
hence we have the right-hand side of the equation (A1) representing the world
utility function.
From here, our set-up is parallel to Ngai and Pissarides (2007), who show
that even with ongoing structural change, the economys aggregate consumption-
income and saving-income ratios are constant. That is, there is a world balanced
growth path. Specically, if aggregate consumption and output are:
c =
P6
k=1 pkck and y =
P6
k=1 pkyk;
where pk and yk are the price and output of good k, then Ngai and Pissarides
(2007) show that in every period, c=y is constant.
Ngai and Pissarides also show that in every period:
Lk
Lk







That is, if the elasticity of substitution, , is less than one, labor in the
sector with the lower productivity growth will shift to the sector with the higher
productivity growth. Moreover, this pattern of labor movement, or structural
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